
RESUMÉ / RÉSUMÉ

Austrian Security Policy – New Tasks and Challenges (Gunther HAUSER)

Austria's security is indivisibly bound up with the security of the European Union. Security policy in Austria today continues along the lines of *pragmatic* neutrality by participating in EU Petersberg and NATO Partnership for Peace tasks. These tasks focus on command and control, development of interoperability with NATO, host nation support and enhancement of capabilities. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides the opportunity for Austria, as a non-NATO member, to take part in NATO's consultative process.

Austria as a member of EU has pivotal interests in integrating Central, Eastern and South-eastern European states into Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security structures. Therefore, Austria principally provides joining international military and police operations in the Balkans.

An appropriate military strategy would focus less on large, low probability wars and hypothetical future threats, and focus more on stability and peace operations. Austria therefore supports enhancing the capacity of the U.N. and associated regional organizations when standing up well-trained, rapidly deployable, sustainable military and police units for peace operations. Austrian troops have been involved in UN peace support operations since 1960. In 2006, about 1,300 troops were active in 13 peacekeeping operations, mostly in southeast Europe (about 800) and on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria (370). Since 1960, about 60,000 Austrian troops participated in sixty international peacekeeping operations. Since 1995, Austria has been a host nation for multinational troops crossing the country for peace support operations in southeast Europe. Within ten years, Austria had been crossed by approximately 160,000 international troops in about 70,000 transports, and more than 200,000 international military aircraft. These facts demonstrate that Austria, while maintaining a form of neutrality, is not taking a free ride.

NATO membership did not enjoy high popularity in Austria. Till the U.S.-led war on Iraq in spring 2003, only small parts of the *Österreichische Volkspartei* (Conservative Party) and the *Freiheitliche Partei* (Freedom Party) voiced their support for NATO membership. Since this U.S.-led invasion, all political parties agreed on neutrality as the principal security concept for Austria. In 2003, the EU officially had no union-wide position dealing with war on Iraq, and member states were split. Austria declared a neutral standpoint, because the UN Security Council had not mandated this U.S.-led war. Austria therefore implored as the Presidency's Statement on Iraq, given in Athens on 16 April 2003, the UN to "*play a central role including in the process leading towards self-government for the Iraqi people, utilising its unique capacity and experience in post-conflict nation building*".

Neutrality still enjoys high popularity among the Austrian population. According to various polls more than two thirds of Austrians still favor neutrality. To lift neutrality a qualified parliamentary majority is needed. Majority of the Austrian population also agree with a deep integration of Austrian Armed Forces into the Euro-Atlantic security process. The Austrian

Armed Forces Reform Commission Report that was published in June 2004 guides the process of adapting Austrian forces to European operation standards.

Necessary emphasis should also be put on non-military security instruments when strengthening multilateral security institutions and the cooperation among them. Austria therefore strongly supports the EU on the way of enhancing conflict prevention as an essential part of its external policy. Conflict prevention means preventing the initial outbreak of violence, also its escalation and its later recurrence. For Austria, the EU is the best existing example of comprehensive democratic security cooperation and coordination among states. In 1994, Austrian population decided in a referendum to become part of this unique European peace community that promotes security among member states and their citizens.

Comprehensive Political Guidance – Its Impact on the Czech Armed Forces (Josef PROCHÁZKA)

Comprehensive Political Guidance reflects trends of the strategic security environment and changing security threats and their risks development. This document aims at achieving political unity on the continuing Alliance transformation into more dynamic military and political tool of global security. In order to fulfill this ambition Alliance has to have at its disposal expeditionary military capabilities, which will be effective for prevention and elimination of crisis situation at any place of the Globe. This force must be capable of interoperable and effective deployment both in military and in nonmilitary kind of operations. It means they have to be capable of both fighting and non-fighting kind of deployment. These implications for the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic are of great importance. The Armed Forces must be prepared to deal with the most likely kind of scenarios as well as capable of quick adaptation to the less likely ones. It means that the Armed Forces must be able to interoperate in a multinational kind of operations in crises outside of the homeland territory. They have to be able to contribute effectively to the defence of the Czech Republic's territory and protection of its inhabitants and be ready for building up of their capabilities. Creation of expeditionary kind of force, the ambition to keep on building the balanced spectrum of operational capabilities and specialization within Alliance is becoming more and more resource demanding process. Restriction of defence expenditures is widening the gap between the Czech Republic's ambitions and available resources.

Fight against Terrorism and International Cooperation (Pavel FOLTIN, David ŘEHÁK)

Today's security environment is characterized by increasing number of signs of international terrorism. As a result of general perception of the threat of terrorism, responses of individual states when suppressing this trend represent one of the key priorities of national security policies. Cooperation and development of a joint effort approach is reflected in establishment of international organizations and agencies that are to enable mutual dialogue and create a forum for unifying individual national procedures in a joint one and defining additional relevant steps. As resulting from its general position, the crucial body in counterterrorism is the United Nations Organization and its special agencies and committees.

However, the role of individual organizations in international relations shall always reflect real support by states involved, measured by allocated financial, material and human resources. Regarding the fact that current security environment is characterized by a high number of security threats, further promotion and development of cooperation and joint activities using international organizations can be viewed as vital in order to succeed in the war on terror.

Future Military Environment (Marek FIEBICH, Antonín KRÁSNÝ)

New threats and risks will not be purely military and therefore they cannot be tackled by military means alone. The future military environment will continue to require an ability to contribute to the fight against terrorism and to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Protection of EU's citizens and interests suggests that an improved inter-pillar framework may be required. From this perspective the integration of joint defence is future requirement and future joint EU forces EU BG are the first step in this process.

The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention: A Moral Perspective (Vilém KOLÍN)

Probably no recent international relations theory issue is more controversial than the use of armed force on humanitarian grounds known as "humanitarian intervention." Humanitarian intervention, however, is a sensitive issue, fraught with difficulty and not susceptible to easy answers. The challenge of a moral appraisal of humanitarian intervention arises from the intersection of two competing ethical demands: the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state on the one hand and the objective of stopping massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law on the other. This inquiry recognizes the moral dilemma and suggests when humanitarian intervention can be justified.

As a primary source and the main point of reference, the proposed inquiry employs the just war ethic. Along with Thomas Aquinas, the inquiry outlines presumptions against the use of armed force and specifies conditions under which the presumptions can be overridden as morally justified exceptions. These exceptions are defined in terms of criteria of the just war ethic, which may be broadly summarized as *jus ad bellum* principles, namely legitimate authority, just cause and rightful intention, defining conditions under which armed force can be used; and *jus in bello* principles, that is, discrimination and proportionality, both of which set limits on how armed force can actually be employed.

The article commences with the description of the meaning of humanitarian intervention. The notion of "legalist paradigm" and the relevance of the United Nations Charter are then sketched as a basis for an account of the changing nature of conflicts and the idea of "military humanitarianism." In doing so, a reference point is provided for a subsequent analysis of Aquinas's doctrine of just war, including the discussion of the significance of legitimate authority and just cause in Aquinas's writing and its contemporary relevance. The theoretical background of the notion of the rightful intention in Aquinas's moral analysis of war, along with an account of the concept of discrimination and proportionality, follow. The article concludes with a section devoted to the scrutiny of the question when humanitarian intervention is justified.

It will be argued that humanitarian intervention meets some of the requirements of the just war doctrine, but not all of them, lending credence to a conclusion that the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, considered in its full aspect, is questionable at best. However, because contradictory ethical principles are inescapably at the heart of humanitarian intervention—the observance of proportionality and discrimination principles, the prohibition on the use of armed force against another state except for defense against armed attack and enforcement measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter; and the objective of stopping serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law—there could hardly be

a definitive moral answer. The just war doctrine can provide principles and guidelines, but not always absolute answers.

Military Actors of Strategic Goals of Stabilization in Iraq (Josef JANOŠEC)

Goal of this contribution is discussing the military actors of strategic goals of stabilization in Iraq. The introduction warns of an unsatisfactory situation of post-war stabilization. Change in this field is needed also from the point of view of the Charter of the United Nations.

Iraq is presented as a space for strategic (long-term) goals of stabilization. The article summarizes geographical, demographic, economical, and political characteristics. The petroleum reserves present a good resource for Iraq, but only in case of rational governance, which the country has been missing during the last 30 years. The prosperous economics were driven to the state of bankruptcy by Saddam Hussein's military adventures. Iraq's population became impoverished. Demographical development lead to adverse age-structure with a large percent of young citizens who have known only life in war-time. Deficiency of state means resulted in higher than 40% illiteracy. Part of the summary also contains fundamental information about former Iraq's armed forces.

Post-war stabilization is a process of seeking the balance of the state. It is unimaginable without the active part of the armed forces. There is a reference to the analogy with the first and second world wars when it was necessary to disarm the defeated forces and build up new armed forces. Failure in the stabilization process, which is also connected with democratization and general acceptance Iraq's new national governance, can mean that either the social situation has not matured, or war has not finished yet, or possibly Iraq's society has disintegrated. Attention is paid to the role of armed forces, casualties in conflict and during the post-war stabilization. Activities of the UN Security Council are also documented.

Military actors of stabilization are systematically analyzed. There are three fundamental groups: combatant armed forces, their management structures, and media as a phenomenon of military and post-war stabilization. Each of the actors is treated of.

Strategic goals of stabilization in Iraq can be described in concordance with the UN Security Council. Iraqi government should fully take over the control over recruitment for the armed forces, their supervision, and responsibility for Iraq's security and defence. Strategic goal is the lasting peace for unified and stable democratic Iraq, which will provide support for new and protected freedoms with a developing market economy. The USA have the largest forces in Iraq, thus it is normal, that they have formulated their own strategy for Iraq (as of 10 January 2007). A short presentation thereof introduces the prospective participation of the USA in the stabilization process in Iraq.

The conclusion expresses conviction, that post-war stabilization without military actors is not possible. At the moment, we are unfortunately missing new solutions that would constitute a new strategic concept of NATO and military activities of the EU.

Private Military Corporations Providing Aviation Services: Profit or Problem?

(Lukáš VISINGR)

Private Military Corporations that provide aviation services have become an essential part of the privatized sector of military. The spectrum of their offer is extremely wide; it begins with

transport and other forms of logistic support, continues with several forms of training and closes with direct battlefield engagement, especially reconnaissance and electronic warfare. Among clients of the firms, there are not only developing states, but also the most powerful countries of the world, including the USA and other NATO members. We can identify many reasons for that, above all the military and financial efficiency and possibility of fast and flexible usage. By contracting the aviation PMCs, the states can occasionally substitute some air capabilities that are disadvantageous to be maintained as long-term ones.

But contracting of these firms brings also some problems. In addition to absence of factual and legal control, there are weaknesses in responsibility for actions of PMCs and weakening of the national armed forces, which become dependent on private corporations. A suitable compromise could be the Private Financing Initiative (payment for letting and simultaneously leasing payments) or other legally warranted methods that guarantee exclusivity or priority for the armed forces in using services of the PMCs.

The rise of PMC providing aviation services influences also the Army of Czech Republic. It has used the private corporations for air transport of soldiers to international missions and now it takes part in the SALIS program. It can't be ruled out that the purchase and running of the new cargo aircraft for the air force of the Army of CR will be solved with support of a private firm. During air exercises with NATO countries, our air force is in contact with corporations that provide assistance of training and it's probable that sooner or later, the air force of ACR will become a client of some of these private entities.

Everything indicates that the importance of the Private Military Corporations specialized in aviation services will further increase. Obviously, soon will come time, when their offer will include the possibility of combat engagement of fighters or attack aircraft. The high probability of this radical enhancement of capabilities of PMCs should urge the international community to eventually start a serious process of institutional grounding and effective legal regulation of the Private Military Corporations.

The U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense and Russian Insecurity (Petr SUCHÝ)

There are some, especially quantitative disproportions between strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and United States today and it is not possible to assume the existence of a strict strategic parity. The scope of Russian arsenal and its qualitative improvements characterized by deployments of new ICBMs, and, in the foreseeable future also of SLBMs, will secure Russia's retaliatory potential in the future and thus will preserve her continual capability to deter the attack by an enemy. Strategic arms reductions of last two decades were mostly bilateral in character. By such an approach the United States tried to persuade Russian leaders that the existence and role of a missile defense system able to face limited ballistic threats poses no menace to Russia and can cause neither the demise nor weakening of strategic stability nor the end of mutual deterrence. It is absolutely clear that Russian leaders shared this view in the past regardless of their rhetoric. A sudden change that occurred, for the time being on the rhetoric level, does not respond to developments of the American missile defense system. Neither radar base located in the Czech Republic, nor ten interceptors potentially deployed in Poland can upset current balance of forces. Russia's harsh rhetoric and declaratory signals should be perceived and evaluated with reserve. A retreat to Russia's pressure would be totally counterproductive. Such

an approach would strengthen her assertive conduct and support her tendencies to view Central European area as a renewed sphere of her influence. To the contrary, it is necessary to send a clear, unequivocal signal that such a conjecture does not meet reality and that confrontational approach on the Russian side, symbolized for example by threats of targeting – with not yet existent medium range missiles – the Czech Republic and Poland would be counterproductive for Russia. On the other hand, Russia would profit from cooperative behavior based on mutual dialog, clarification of positions and potential concerns and insecurities. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that attempts to convince Russian political leaders about benign character of the U.S. BMD system vis-a-vis Russia will not be easy, if it is at all possible to expect such an outcome. However, such a stance does not stem from the lack of technical data and information on parameters of the American missile defense system, or from the current state of strategic offensive weapons but rather from Russian strategic culture.