

EVOLUTIONAL TRENDS OF POLISH MILITARY FORCES IN LONGTERM VIEWS

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Anotace:

Článek polského autora otiskujeme záměrně tak, jak jej dodal, tedy v angličtině. Věříme, že se to může stát jednou z charakteristik našeho časopisu a že naši čtenáři to budou považovat za zpestření.

Článek pojednává o výhledech rozvoje polských ozbrojených sil. Jak by se měl tento vývoj vyrovnat se změnami v oblasti politické a jak by měl čelit novým výzvám 21. století. Diskutuje i otázky nakolik by se polské ozbrojené síly měly rozvíjet podle vzoru armád NATO a nakolik podle vlastních národních priorit. Vývozuje, že v tomto smyslu jsou polské ozbrojené síly teprve na počátku transformace, která by jim dala šanci nejen přežít, ale dosáhnout pokroku v měnících se podmínkách na začátku 21. století.

An inevitable attribute of the State's function is the thinking about choice of the national paths of progress. The security and defence sphere remains an extraordinary domain of this thinking. Hence, the answers what way to function as well as to act efficiently in terms of changes in the modern world must be taken from the set of basic question for every nation. Especially, when these questions concern the most important issue – the reason of State protection as well as the multinational sector's aspiration of progress. It is also necessary to include in this set the questions of trends and possibilities of the military forces – modification in the light of current changes - as this is undoubtedly one of the most important tools of the State policy.

Undoubtedly, if the reform activity is to be advisable and efficient to prepare perfectly the military forces for solving the future tasks, it is necessary to deal with this future. This activity should be focused upon precise identification of new hardly expected events and processes, that would be able to influence potentially the functioning of State both positive and negative way. Certainly, the hope that future will be exactly predictable in the way determined by scale of our defence needs is out of question. The future always will be different since unpredictability has become a dominant

trait of reality, which ten years ago was incidentally called by C. Powell as the most serious endangering of American security. So the future will not be a linear continuation of the present and past time. Hence, we prefer projecting and shaping to improving and matching old elements. These preferred activities must be priorities of our activity.

The above consideration has tremendous importance for constructive activities. It allows focusing upon critical security problems, which just begin or are going to be soon the main object of the State activity in all fields of its functioning as well as political activity – in every place where employment of the military forces may be necessary. The course of projecting the military forces in the above aspect will orient the adaptation process towards the actions, which at present are less significant or not scheduled as the tasks performed by military forces. But even for a not professional observer it seems that the list of these tasks become longer and longer. The military forces ought not to be prepared for performing the tasks, which came from the past. It is necessary to construct a tool for the actions, which may become the contribution of Poland in all fields of its political activity in the medium or longer views. While expressing this in the language of facts, the purpose of projecting objective strategy and the military strategy of the State is to quit planning activity together with aiming at improvement of the existing military forces, because they miss the brightly elaborated knowledge on required status as well as vision and conception of this knowledge. The same important task is to withdraw from the actions taken on abstract and incoherent trends determined by current impact of needs, tasks, conditions and opinions: for example: the next year budget does not allow you to maintain the present greatness of the army – reduction; geopolitical changes in the environment – another dislocation; shortages of armament and equipment - change of structures; new numbers of tasks NATO - temporary adaptation; another lower budget - another reduction etc. While following the above sequence of events it is necessary to remind the previously mentioned mistake based upon decreasing the research horizon to the local or sub-regional size. The same is with ignorance and underestimation of megatrends and pan-regional tendencies as objective determinants of existence, progress and the State's performance of multinational sector's interests. Finally, maybe the most important question – problem of excessive attachment to the classical tasks of military forces as well as the ways and terms of their performance, while not perceiving the dynamic trend, that changes character and range of military tasks, including combat effort. A verified rule is the fact, that some time after some war most of armies get ready for another military activity into which the imaginations of recent war are transferred from the experience stored in collective memory. Armament systems, education of the armies, models of operational rules of the military activity are constructed on the basis of known and familiar system of reference – recent war (action, operation). While analysing shortcomings of recent war, successes and failures, the ways of activities and military assets are improved assuming that the historical events may happen again and we want to achieve the same objectives in similar conditions as before. But it is impossible, anyway.

What is necessary to do to meet the ongoing changes? Which trends of the military forces' modification in functional aspect are desired nowadays? It seems that a key important issue is to answer the following questions. Does the way of Polish military forces' development have to be the same as the way of our NATO predecessors? Will the passive army's adaptation to the western patterns solve the security problem of the Polish Republic for a long time in the light of tremendous dynamics of changes in the environment? Will it be only the run after unattainable pattern? Will the NATO still exist after 10—15 years? The main field of our searching should be the problem of choosing way –passive follow-up in the above mentioned footsteps or proactive undertakings. Answering the question what is to be done today to act efficiently tomorrow requires noticing the below important fact. Progress, power and authority in the currently emerging world will be more and more connected with creating chances and taking advantage of them or endangering avoidance instead or protection against it (as a commonly accepted norm). Nowadays this ability becomes tremendously important at the background of the emerging picture of reality determined by considerable dynamics of political, economical, social, cultural religious and – maybe particularly – military changes. For the present, the top of our dreams and ambitions is to ensure the capability of defence against endangering and then to get in close relations with industrial power states achieving their level of prosperity. It seems that this is a dead-end street and hopeless trend of civilisation development. Even the highest real pace of our progress within tens of years will not allow us to be as best as champions used to. Anyway, they also do not stand still. After 10—20 years these leading countries will live in different civilisation age. It will be the kingdom of information power and its prosperity. Even the biggest army, the best defence infrastructure, collective territory defence and membership in the strongest alliances will not give us guarantee of security. There will be only bigger hope and higher probability of eradicating danger. Such improvement of our frame of mind will cost us more and more effort, assets and time. This is also a dead end street with no chances for success. Current strength and superiority (domination) of the states, which seriously think of the future time allow them to change system of forces and assets to different orientation – common creation of chance and taking advantage of this, which is the third stage of civilisation progress. In the XXI century information will decide about strength, power, prosperity and authority of individuals, organisations, countries, alliances etc. The chance for Poland and its citizens is to take risk of strategic leap replacing attempts of follow-up in the above mentioned footsteps with effort of obeying different values. It is necessary to attain the objectives in other fields employing different methods. It equally concerns the mutually connected branches of economy, community and military forces. The increase in educational investment about 2, 3 or 5% in the succeeding budget plans is not a strategic problem in this light. It is sensible to come up with the assumption that double increase in these investments (incredible to think about it today) does not create the essential conditions for civilisation leap. A budget is only one aspect of this problem. The same important thing is the projecting and implementation of systemic and promotion mechanisms of searching. They are necessary to make this leap, to

shape the social awareness, will and attitudes to strategy of leap, which are necessary to complete this leap process. Other important factors are as follows: thinking in chance categories, identification or gaining essential (the best) assets and conceptual preparation for changes. Only a synergetic sum of the mentioned factors ensures the conditions, which are necessary to take advantage of the chance connected with the civilisation leap.

While seeking answer for questions like topicality and value of patterns, imaginations, models and norms currently applied as the basis for strategy of the military forces' activity and development we must take into account the below changes among others. These changes have lasted since World War Two, they take place nowadays or they may appear in the future. First of all, there are new aspects of strength and domination like technological, informational and power industrial domination. Many times the nature of enemy will not be classical. For instance: Mafia, terrorists, macro-business, sects etc. The role and speed of manoeuvre will increase in regional and global scale.

The same important problem as the logical aspect of the military forces' problems presented herewith is the question of organisational structure and urgency of its change. In the light of above verified things the urgency of structural changes in the range of military forces is extremely visible. It results both from the considerable dynamics of relations in the national environment as well as the military forces' location in State – one of the superior elements – the State. The situational and environmental requirements above presented will allow for neither commanding the military forces nor maintaining the organisational structure preserved till now. Since every structure is strongly relevant to the certain conception (structure) of activity and the certain style of guiding these activities, so approving the synonymous structure would be one aspect preparation for doing function only in one aspect situations in relation to only one type of needs, objectives and conditions. Therefore the results caused by this synonymous aspects would have one way course and aspect. For this reason one can assume that most of presented and identified requirements point at urgency of projecting the organisation of matrix function character. The matrix character of the military forces' function should allow maintaining all its elements and functional branches at proper level of (combat) readiness without synonymous preparation for synonymous tasks. The most important ability of such system should be the highest speed of taking a reasonable decision in all situations together with the program easiness of creating casual purpose-to-task teams in certain situations (organic structures), which resulted this way. Concluding from the above question, while projecting the structure of military forces the thing is in its ability of rapid and elastic reaction to changes in the environment. This is strict connection between elastic structure with elastic strategy. Such structure has programmable feature and ability of permanent overtaking the foreseen actions. It means that this structure employs the proactive and innovation strategy maintaining the permanent readiness of structure for immediate introducing the essential innovations to wait for the prognostic action. In the language of facts it means necessity of the military forces organisational structure projecting, which would allow elastic sharing the actions taken by the NATO

resulting both from the Article 5 of Washington Treaty and other reasons from one hand. From the other hand, this structure reflects necessity of employing the military forces only in national military actions. Their range begins from helping people during disasters through stopping inflows of emigrants and refugees (for instance from Asia), dealing with results of malfunctions in nuclear power station, fighting with criminals and cyber terrorism to participating in the nuclear war. There is an obvious conclusion – the structure and strategy alternate each other. Their dialectic connection requires special skills, knowledge and maturity from the Heads of National Defence. This is also an important trend of the military forces' adaptation to do their function in the radically changing environment.

In the conclusion one can state, that the Polish military forces are barely at the beginning of transformation. Anyway they are closer to the beginning than its end. The some year plans of the military forces' restructuring must not decide about changes in the military forces. These plans may be used only for temporary activity, satisfying needs and solving current problems. For the present, urgency of change concerns the problems of more serious or maybe even revolution character. As the matter of fact the question is whether we will run after this elusive shadow left by magnates of this world? Will we chose another, maybe the more difficult and risky way, which gives a chance not only for survival but also for progress in changing conditions at the beginning of XXI century?